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This paper develops a theory of analog representation. We first argue that the mark 
of the analog is to be found in the nature of a representational system’s interpretation 
function, rather than in its vehicles or contents alone. We then develop the rulebound structure 
theory of analog representation, according to which analog systems are those marked by the 
use of interpretive rules that map syntactic structural features onto semantic structural 
features. The theory involves three degree-theoretic measures that capture three 
independent ways in which a system can be more or less analog. We explain how our theory 
improves upon prior accounts of analog representation, provides plausible diagnoses for 
novel challenge cases, extends to hybrid systems that are partially analog and partially 
symbolic, and accounts for some of the advantages and disadvantages of representing 
analogically versus symbolically. 
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There is a commonly drawn distinction between analog and symbolic 
representation. Paradigms of analog representation include mercury thermometers, 
hand-clocks, photographs, drawings, line graphs, heat maps, and audio recordings. 
Paradigms of symbolic representation include digital thermometers, digital clocks, 
binary data, maritime signal flags, traffic lights, and words. The distinction between 
the analog and the symbolic is appealed to across a diverse range of disciplines, both 
within philosophy and beyond.1 But while the difference between the analog and 
the symbolic appears intuitive, there is a good deal of controversy over how to 
analyze the distinction. What, exactly, is the mark of the analog?2 
This paper develops what we call the rulebound structure theory of analog 
representation. The central claim of the theory is that analog systems are those 
marked by the use of interpretive rules that map syntactic structural features onto 
semantic structural features. Our goal is to develop this idea into a systematic theory 
that yields plausible verdicts across a spectrum of cases, including some novel cases 
that to our knowledge have never been discussed. We develop three degree-
theoretic measures—analog mirroring, analog purity, and analog mass—each of which 
captures a different way a system can be more or less analog. Alongside these first-
order claims, we also stake out a methodological position about where the mark of 
the analog lies: namely, in the nature of a representational system’s interpretation 
function.  
 
1 References to analog representation occur in the philosophy of science (Papayannopoulos 
2020, Sterrett 2017, Trenholme 1994), philosophy of art (Goodman 1968, Lopes 2018, 
Thomson-Jones 2015), epistemology (Dretske 1981), philosophy of perception (Beck 2019, 
Block forthcoming, Peacocke 1986), cognitive science (Dehaene 1997, Feigenson et al. 2002, 
Shagrir 2010), computer science (Vergis et al. 1986, Siegelmann & Fishman 1998, Xue 2016), 
and electrical engineering (Couch 2013). 
2 The terms ‘iconic’, ‘pictorial’, and ‘imagistic’ are sometimes used instead of ‘analog’ and the 
terms ‘digital’ and ‘discursive’ are sometimes used instead of ‘symbolic’. Some (though 
certainly not all) uses of these terms aim at the same representational kind we seek to capture. 
We will remain neutral throughout the paper on any relationships between the analog, the 
iconic, the pictorial, and the imagistic. 




The focus on structural features places the rulebound structure theory 
within the structural approach to analog representation. Theories within this 
approach can be thought of as unified by the core idea that analog representation 
involves structure corresponding to structure. Other theories within the structural 
family include density theories (Goodman 1968, Haugeland 1981, Schonbein 2014), 
magnitude mirroring theories (Lewis 1971, Maley 2011, Beck 2019, Peacocke 2019), 
and abstraction theories (Kulvicki 2015). We will explain how the rulebound 
structure theory handles a number of challenges facing these other views and 
develops a more systematic analysis of what it means for structure to correspond to 
structure. 
§1 argues first that the mark of the analog lies in a system’s interpretation 
function (rather than in its vehicles or contents), and then claims that interpretation 
functions are best thought of as rules mapping inputs to outputs (rather than merely 
as sets of input-output pairs). §2 addresses how the idea of isomorphism relates to 
analog representation and provides a basis for the development of our positive 
theory. §3 and §4 contain the bulk of the rulebound structure theory, where we 
develop three degree-theoretic measures of analogicity. §5 extends our theory to 
hybrid systems that are partly analog and partly symbolic. §6 explains how our 
theory relates to and improves upon extant theories of analog representation. §7 
addresses objections. §8 discusses the advantages and disadvantages of 
representing analogically versus symbolically. 
 
1. Foundations 
We begin with some preliminary remarks on how to think about 
representational systems and where to look for the mark of the analog.  
 
1.1. The Interpretation Function 
Every representational system has vehicles, contents, and an interpretation 
function. The vehicles are the representers, the contents are the represented, and the 




interpretation function maps vehicles to contents.3 Consider a digital clock (a 
paradigmatic symbolic system): the vehicles are numeral displays, the contents are 
times of day, and the interpretation function maps ‘12:01’ to one minute after noon. 
Or consider a mercury thermometer (a paradigmatic analog system): the vehicles 
are thermometers individuated by mercury heights, the contents are temperatures, 
and the interpretation function maps 6cm of mercury to 30°C. 
This paper is an investigation into what makes a representation analog. But 
first we must ask: where should one look for the mark of the analog?4 The obvious 
options include looking at a system’s vehicles, contents, or interpretation function 
While methodological views about where to look are rarely made explicit, vehicular 
rhetoric dominates the literature. For example, Quilty-Dunn [2017: 61] states that 
“formats are general types of vehicular structures,” and Beck [2019: 323] writes that 
he will “understand the thesis that perception is analog solely as a claim about 
perception’s vehicles.” Others have favored alternative approaches: for example, 
Haugeland [1991] favors a content approach and Goodman [1968] defends a hybrid 
vehicle-content account. 
We think that neither vehicle nor content approaches identify the true mark 
of analog representation. As a preliminary argument, observe that it is possible for 
(1) the same contents to be represented either analogically or symbolically and (2) 
 
3 We use the term ‘vehicles’ to refer to syntactically individuated vehicle types rather than 
vehicle tokens. A mercury thermometer whose 6cm of mercury represents 30°C may be 
token-distinct but still type-identical to a second mercury thermometer whose 6cm also 
represents 30°C. Note that syntactic types are usually more coarsely individuated than 
physical types: even if the first thermometer contains one more atom of mercury than the 
second, that will probably not suffice for a syntactic difference between the two.  
4 Our talk of a search for the mark of the analog designates an investigation into the grounds, 
rather than the bearers, of analogicity. We are primarily concerned with what makes 
something analog, rather than which entities bear the property of being analog. Insofar as 
we have a view about bearers, we are inclined to think that the primary bearers of analogicity 
are representational systems. But we also believe that one may permissibly talk of vehicles, 
contents, or interpretation functions as being analog when they belong to a system that has 
what we take to be the mark of the analog: namely, the use of rules that map syntactic 
structural features onto semantic structural features. Thanks to an anonymous referee for 
helpful discussion of the grounds/bearers distinction. 




the same vehicles to represent either analogically or symbolically. To see the first 
dissociation, consider a digital clock versus a hand-clock. Both systems represent 
times of day, so both have the same contents. But the digital clock is symbolic while 
the hand-clock is analog. To see the second dissociation, consider a spy tapping on 
a desk to send a message in Morse code versus a geologist tapping on a desk to 
describe a pattern of seismic wave activity. Even if the two series of taps are 
indistinguishable, the spy’s taps represent symbolically whereas the geologist’s taps 
represent analogically.5 
Our view is that the mark of the analog is found in a system’s interpretation 
function, rather than in its vehicles or contents alone. Call this the interpretation 
function approach.6 On this view, analog representation is a matter of how vehicles 
represent contents, rather than what does the representing or what is represented. 
As a corollary, analogicity is first and foremost a property of representational 
systems (rather than individual representations). The examples above of spies, 
geologists, and clocks are evidence in favor of the interpretation function approach. 
Nevertheless, while our focus on the interpretation function is in some ways a 
departure from prior vehicle (and content) approaches, this shift constitutes a less 
radical break from orthodoxy than it may initially appear. Many theorists who 
employ vehicular rhetoric clearly care about interpretation functions. For example, 
Beck [2019: 334] argues that analogicity is a matter of vehicles covarying with 
contents, indicating he is committed to the interpretation function approach despite 
his aforementioned emphasis on vehicles. Given this, we think that the 
interpretation function approach better captures what many theorists have had in 
mind all along. 
 
5 One might seek to individuate vehicles in a way that permitted physically indistinguishable 
vehicles, such as the spy’s and the geologist’s taps, to count as distinct kinds of vehicles. We 
will simply note that the examples preceding this footnote are illustrative and preliminary. 
Our argument for the interpretation function, rather than vehicle or content, approach to 
analog representation is largely supported by the usefulness of that methodology, which will 
be manifest over the course of the paper.  
6 Examples of interpretation function theorists include Barwise and Hammer [1996], Burge 
[2018], and Frigario, Giordani, and Mari [2013], though they vary in the representational 
kinds targeted. 






How are interpretation functions individuated? At minimum, any two 
interpretation functions with distinct input-output pairs are not identical. The more 
interesting question is whether there is more to the nature of an interpretation 
function than its inputs and outputs. In our view, interpretation functions (and thus 
representational systems) are best individuated by how inputs are mapped to 
outputs. In other words, we must look to the rules the system uses to map vehicles 
to contents. 
This idea can be illustrated via a debate from the history of mathematics 
about the nature of mathematical functions: is a function any set of input-output 
pairs, or is it a rule for getting from inputs to outputs?7 To illustrate, consider the 
following two functions: 
 
f(x) =  x2 





These functions yield the same output for any input, but they use different 
rules to move from those inputs to those outputs. The prevailing convention in 
mathematics is extensionalist: mathematical functions are individuated purely in 
terms of input-output pairings. But we think that for the purpose of investigating 
representational systems, it is better to take a more fine-grained intensionalist 
approach, where interpretation functions are individuated by the rules that are used 
to map inputs to outputs.8 On this picture, every representational system has rules 
by which it maps vehicles to contents, and even representational systems that have 
 
7 For example, Euler [1748] defined a function as a rule—an “analytic expression”—for 
generating outputs from inputs. Schönfinkel [1924] was more liberal, permitting any 
arbitrary correspondence to count as a function as long as each input generated only one 
output. For discussions of this debate, see Kleiner [2009] and Youschkevitch [1976]. 
8 The best example we know of a theory of analog representation that revolves around the 
rules of the interpretation function is Frigario, Giordani, and Mari [2013]. 




the exact same input-output vehicle-content pairs can nevertheless be distinct in 
virtue of deploying different rules.9 
To motivate the idea that the rules of the interpretation function matter when 
evaluating whether a representational system is analog or symbolic, consider the 
following two systems: 
 
————— 
Stipulated Population Map—Vehicles: 100 shades of red. Contents: 100 population 
densities. Interpretation: Stipulated one-by-one assignment of shades of red to 
population densities. 
 
Structural Population Map—Vehicles: 100 shades of red. Contents: 100 population 
densities. Interpretation: If shade1 is darker than shade2 then the content of shade1 
(a population density) is denser than the content of shade2. 
————— 
 
These systems map all the same vehicles (inputs) to all the same contents 
(outputs), but they do so using different rules. Stipulated Population Map assigns each 
red shade one-by-one to a specific population density. Structural Population Map 
assigns contents using one simple rule: “darker shades represent greater population 
density.” Even though the systems have identical input-output structures, Stipulated 
Population Map seems symbolic while Structural Population Map seems analog. We 
believe this felt difference corresponds to a real difference in representational kind.10 
 
9 Rules need not be systematic. For example, a brute assignment of each individual vehicle 
to its content still counts as a rule. It is plausible that many symbolic systems rely on rules of 
this nature. 
10 For readers who are uncertain about our appeals to intuitions about which systems are 
more analog, we wish to emphasize that this paper is not a conceptual analysis of the word 
‘analog’ or the concept ANALOG. Instead, we think there is an important difference in 
representational kind between cases like Structural Population Map and Stipulated Population 
Map, and we think the terms ‘analog’ and ‘symbolic’ work well for tracking this difference. 
When we say that one system “seems more analog” than another, we seek to evoke the 
reader’s feeling for that difference. §7.3 discusses related issues. 




And we think the difference is best explained by the fact that the systems have 
different interpretive rules. From this point forward, we will take as given that the 
nature of a representational system depends not only on the input-output structure 
of a system, but also on the rules that constitute its interpretation function. 
We will remain largely neutral on the nature of rules. This is because we 
want our claims to be compatible with a variety of views about the nature of 
interpretation functions and about representation more generally. For example, 
rules need not be understood as linguistically expressible sets of directions. Our use 
of the term ‘rules’ is intended merely to designate how an interpretation function 
maps vehicles to contents. Unless one is prepared to deny that there can be distinct 
representational systems with the same inputs and outputs, and consequently deny 
that there is any representationally relevant difference between Stipulated Population 
Map and Structural Population Map, one is committed to the idea that interpretation 
functions have rules. 
Our claims so far are as follows. When determining whether a 
representational system is analog, one should look at the system’s interpretation 
function and not only at vehicles or contents. Furthermore, one should look at the 
rules of the interpretation function. These claims are methodological, in the sense 
that they are claims about where to look for the mark of the analog rather than claims 
about what to look for. §3 and §4 develop our positive theory of analog representation, 
which explains what to look for. 
 
2. Isomorphism 
The unifying theme behind the structural approach to analog representation 
is that analog representation is a matter of structure corresponding to structure. For 
many readers, this idea will immediately evoke the notion of isomorphism. An 
isomorphism is, roughly put, a structure-preserving bijective function. Though we do 
not think that isomorphism provides a satisfactory criterion for analog 
representation, it will be useful to begin with a discussion of isomorphism and 
develop our theory from that basis. 
Although the term ‘isomorphism’ is common in the literature on analog 
representation, there is a surprising lack of uniformity in what is meant by 




‘isomorphism theory’.11 In some cases, the intended idea is that a system is analog 
just in case there is an isomorphism between its vehicles and its contents. We will 
argue shortly that such a claim is at best incomplete and at worst false. In other cases, 
invocations of the term ‘isomorphism’ are simply intended to express the general 
idea behind all structural approaches: that analog representation involves similar 
structure between vehicles and contents. We think that such an idea is on the right 
track. But a satisfying theory demands a more systematic analysis. This section aims 
to explain more precisely what an isomorphism is, articulate what we take to be the 
best version of an isomorphism theory of analog representation, and argue that such 
a theory is nevertheless inadequate. 
At first pass, it is natural to characterize the isomorphism theory as 
endorsing the following criterion: a system is analog just in case there exists an 
isomorphism between its vehicles and its contents. Consider how in Mercury 
Thermometer, there seems to be an isomorphism between mercury heights and 
temperatures, whereas in the system for a digital thermometer, there does not seem 
to be an isomorphism between numerals and temperatures. However, this criterion 
is extremely weak. Consider the following systems: 
 
————— 
Mercury Thermometer—Vehicles: 100 mercury heights. Contents: 100 temperatures. 
Interpretation: If height1 is taller than height2 then the content of height1 (a 
temperature) is warmer than the content of height2. 
 
Scrambled Thermometer—Vehicles: 100 mercury heights. Contents: 100 
temperatures. Interpretation: An unsystematic one-by-one bijective assignment of 




11 See Beck [2015, 2019], Blachowicz [1997], Block [forthcoming], Frigario, Giordani, Mari 
[2013], Kulvicki [2014: 174], Maley[2011], Shepard [1978]. Haugeland [1991] calls the 
isomorphism account the “canonical account." 




Mercury Thermometer and Scrambled Thermometer contain exactly the same 
vehicles and exactly the same contents. Therefore, if there exists an isomorphism 
between the vehicles and contents for Mercury Thermometer, then there also exists an 
isomorphism between the vehicles and contents for Scrambled Thermometer. But 
Mercury Thermometer is analog while Scrambled Thermometer is not. Therefore, 
whether there exists an isomorphism between vehicles and contents cannot be 
enough to decide whether a system is analog. 
A natural move at this point is to appeal to the fact that the systems map 
vehicles to contents differently. More specifically, perhaps instead of asking whether 
there exists some function or other that is an isomorphism between heights and 
temperatures, we should instead ask about a very specific function: the 
interpretation function.12 The interpretation function of Mercury Thermometer always 
maps greater heights of mercury to warmer temperatures; the interpretation 
function of Scrambled Thermometer does not. This strategy succeeds in delivering 
distinct verdicts on the analogicity of Mercury Thermometer versus Scrambled 
Thermometer. However, the strategy works only in cases where the two 
interpretation functions differ extensionally (i.e. with respect to which inputs get 
mapped to which outputs). The following example illustrates how even systems 
with extensionally equivalent interpretation functions can differ in analogicity (an 
idea already alluded to in §1): 
 
————— 
Lucky Scrambled Thermometer—Vehicles: 100 mercury heights. Contents: 100 
temperatures. Interpretation: A stipulative one-by-one bijective assignment of 
mercury heights to temperatures, where by luck of the random assignment, each 
 
12 The only extant account of analog representation we are aware of that requires that the 
interpretation function itself must be an isomorphism is developed by Frigario, Giordani, 
and Mari [2013]. Nevertheless, there are views in the vicinity. Barwise and Hammer [1996] 
appeal to interpretation functions to give an account of homomorphic representations. Burge 
[2018] appeals to interpretation functions (although he does not use that term) to give an 
account of iconic representations. 








If we consider only inputs and outputs, then the interpretation function of 
Mercury Thermometer is indistinguishable from that of Lucky Scrambled Thermometer. 
But Lucky Scrambled Thermometer is intuitively not analog. This kind of problem 
arises for any view that considers only the inputs and outputs of interpretation 
functions. Even when two systems have interpretation functions with identical 
input-output structures, the way that they map those inputs to outputs can matter 
for whether or not the systems are analog. In what follows, we explain how this 
idea—as well as the notion of isomorphism itself—can be made precise. 
Let a space be an ordered pair of a set of elements and a set of relations on 
those elements.13 Mercury heights paired with a “taller-than” relation is a space. 
Mercury heights paired with a “twice-the-height-of” relation is another space. Let X  
= <DX, RX> and Y = <DY, RY> be spaces. A function f from DX to DY is an isomorphism 
between X and Y just in case the following three criteria are satisfied: 
 
(1) f is a bijection, meaning that f maps every element of DX to a unique 
element of DY and every element of DY is the output f(x) for some x in DX. 
(2) RX and RY each contain at least one relation. 
(3) For every relation rX in RX, there is a relation rY in RY, such that for any 
elements x1 and x2 in DX, rX(x1, x2) if and only if rY(f(y1), f(y2)), and for every rY 
in RY, there is an analogous rX in RX.  
 
The third criterion says that every relation in space X has a counterpart 
relation in space Y, and every relation in Y has a counterpart in X, such that two 
elements of X bear that relation if and only if their counterparts in Y bear the 
counterpart relation.14 If the third criterion is satisfied, then the function preserves the 
 
13 The phrase “relations on those elements” requires that for each relation, some elements in 
the domain in fact bear that relation. 
14 These definitions are formulated in terms of binary relations, but they apply 
straightforwardly to relations of any adicity. We assume the generalized formulation moving 
forward. 




relevant relations. Note that while the function f is a function from the set DX to the 
set DY, f is an isomorphism between the space X and the space Y. In total, there are 
three ways that there can be a failure of isomorphism: (1) if f is not a bijection, (2) if 
the spaces contain no relations, or (3) if f does not preserve the relations on the 
spaces.15 
Strictly speaking, it does not make sense to talk about isomorphism 
simpliciter between a set of vehicles and a set of contents: isomorphism is a relation 
between structured spaces, rather than a relation between unstructured sets. This 
means that when speaking of isomorphism, it is important to specify the relations 
(or spaces) with respect to which the isomorphism holds. Even if a function f is an 
isomorphism between set D1 paired with relation r1 to D2 paired with r2, f may 
nevertheless fail to be an isomorphism between D1 and D2 paired with other 
relations. For example, even though f(x) = ex is an isomorphism from the real 
numbers under addition to the positive reals under multiplication, it is not an 
isomorphism from the real numbers under addition to the positive reals under 
addition. Though this may initially strike some as a technical detail, the point 
matters for developing a theory of analog representation. Theorists often make 
claims about isomorphism that leave implicit which relations structure the spaces. 
This underspecification is problematic: since the physical world is replete with 
relations, it is easy to find isomorphisms between any two domains. Because of this, 
the claim that there exists an isomorphism between a system’s vehicles and its 
contents is almost trivial. Moreover, even the more specific claim that the 
interpretation function itself is an isomorphism between the set of vehicles and the 
set of contents is incomplete: the relevant relations on the vehicles and the contents 
must also be specified. 
 
15 A mathematical example of isomorphism might help precisify these ideas. f(x) = ex is an 
isomorphism between the real numbers ℝ under addition and the positive real numbers ℝ+ 
under multiplication. In this case, the domains are the real numbers and the positive real 
numbers and the relations are addition and multiplication (understood as triadic relations). 
The first criterion is satisfied because ex is a bijection from ℝ to ℝ+. The second criterion is 
satisfied because the equality ex + y = ex  × ey ensures relation preservation: x + y = z iff f(x) × f(y) 
= f(z). Therefore, the spaces are isomorphic. 




We now turn to a crucial issue. Supposing that isomorphism is important for 
analog representation, what are the relations with respect to which the isomorphism 
must hold? Different structural approaches to analog representation will answer 
this question differently. Some will say magnitude relations, others dense relations, 
and yet others abstraction relations. By contrast, the rulebound structure theory says 
that the relevant relations are whichever figure into the rules of the interpretation 
function. Every system has an interpretation function that maps vehicles to contents 
via certain rules. Those rules take into consideration certain relations and not others. 
For example, Mercury Thermometer has a rule that says that taller heights represent 
warmer temperatures. More precisely, let a system’s rulebound relations be the 
relations that are codified by the rules of its interpretation function. Taller-than is 
rulebound in Mercury Thermometer; redder-than is not. On our view, the relations that 
matter for isomorphism are the system’s rulebound relations. This approach 
suggests the following criterion: 
 
The Isomorphism Criterion 
A system is analog just in case its interpretation function is an isomorphism 
between the syntactic space and the semantic space. 
 
The syntactic space is the space consisting of all the vehicles of the system 
paired with all the rulebound relations on those vehicles. The semantic space is the 
space consisting of all the contents of the systems paired with the rulebound 
relations on those contents. In order to satisfy the isomorphism criterion, a system 
must have an interpretation function that is a bijection, that codifies at least one 
relation, and that preserves the relation(s) that it codifies. This makes the above 
isomorphism criterion much more substantial than the earlier criterion (that there 
exists some isomorphism between vehicles and contents). Mercury Thermometer 
satisfies the isomorphism criterion because its interpretation function is an 
isomorphism between its syntactic and semantic spaces: taller-than and warmer-than 
are rulebound and the interpretation function preserves them. By contrast, neither 
Scrambled Thermometer nor Lucky Scrambled Thermometer satisfy the isomorphism 
criterion because neither system has rulebound relations that can be preserved in 
the first place. These observations indicate that the isomorphism criterion provides 




a more accurate, substantive, and precise distinction between the analog and the 
symbolic than prior accounts that appeal more casually to the notion of 
isomorphism. 
Nevertheless, we still think that the isomorphism criterion is inadequate as 
a general theory of analog representation. The basic problem is that systems that 




Scrambled Population Map—Vehicles: 100 shades of red. Contents: 100 population 
densities. Interpretation: A stipulative bijective mapping between shades of red and 
population density, with no correspondence between darkness of shade and 
density. 
 
Almost Isomorphic Population Map—Vehicles: 100 shades of red. Contents: 100 
population densities. Interpretation: A systematic bijective mapping between 
shades of red and population density, with darker shades corresponding to greater 
densities, except that the darkest shade is mapped to the second densest population 
and the second darkest shade is mapped to the densest. 
————— 
 
Scrambled Population Map maps shades of red to population densities 
arbitrarily. Almost Isomorphic Population Map maps shades of red to population 
densities systematically, with exceptions for the two darkest shades and densest 
populations. Neither of these systems satisfies the isomorphism criterion, since 
neither function preserves the rulebound relations in the mapping from the 
syntactic to the semantic space. Yet it is intuitive that Almost Isomorphic Population 
Map is more analog than Scrambled Population Map. Our diagnosis is that the 
difference is due to the fact that Almost Isomorphic Population Map nearly satisfies the 
isomorphism criterion whereas Scrambled Population Map does not come close. 
The core problem is that isomorphism is all-or-nothing, whereas analogicity 
comes in degrees. Consequently, the isomorphism criterion—at least by itself—is 
inadequate for capturing the degreed aspects of analog representation. Still, we 




think that appeals to isomorphism are on the right track. If analog representation is 
a matter of structure corresponding to structure, then isomorphism is a promising 
start towards developing that idea. The preceding discussion sets the stage for our 
positive theory, where we will define a degree-theoretic variant of the isomorphism 
criterion that captures a core dimension of analogicity. 
Before moving forward, it is worth making a point about the kinds of 
systems that will serve as our examples.16 We will focus on systems whose 
rulebound relations range over whole vehicles and whole contents (e.g. Mercury 
Thermometer’s taller-than relation), rather than on systems whose rulebound relations 
range over parts of vehicles or parts of contents (e.g. a photograph’s darker-than 
relation between individual pixels). We focus on the former kinds of systems both 
because they are simpler and because we think the canonical examples of analog 
representation mostly fall within that class. However, our measures of analogicity 
also apply to systems within the latter category. Our measures appeal to rulebound 
relations, and each measure applies whether those relations relate wholes to wholes 
or parts to parts. 
 
3. Mirroring 
Our theory consists of three degree-theoretic measures of analogicity. This 
section focuses on the first and most central measure: analog mirroring. To set the 
stage, consider again Scrambled Population Map (which maps shades of red to 
 
16 Two simplifying assumptions are worth mentioning. First, we assume free recombination, 
meaning that a vehicle (or content) that takes a value along one parameter (e.g. size) can take 
any value along a different parameter (e.g. color). Free recombination prohibits a system in 
which each vehicle has both a height and either a red, blue, or green color, yet a green vehicle 
of 10cm is not well-formed, even though vehicles with every other height and color 
combination are. Second, we assume comparability, meaning that every pair of vehicles (or 
contents) is related by each relation. Comparability prohibits a situation in which two 
vehicles are incommensurable along a parameter (e.g. size). Going forward, we assume that 
the systems we target satisfy both free recombination and comparability (on their syntactic 
and semantic domains). Although we think that some oddball systems do not obey these 
principles, we do not think that the price of the extra complications in the main presentation 
of our theory are worth the benefit of accommodating these cases. 




population densities arbitrarily) and Almost Isomorphic Population Map (which maps 
shades of red to population densities systematically except for a mismatch between 
the two darkest shades and two densest populations). Neither of these systems 
satisfies the isomorphism criterion. Yet Almost Isomorphic Population Map seems 
more analog than Scrambled Population Map. 
A natural explanation for the difference is that it is easy to whittle down 
Almost Isomorphic Population Map into a system that satisfies isomorphism: all one 
needs to do is remove a single element from the syntactic space (e.g. the darkest 
shade of red will do) and a single element from the semantic space (e.g. the second 
densest population). By contrast, turning Scrambled Population Map into a system 
that satisfies isomorphism is either difficult or impossible. These observations hint 
at the basic idea behind analog mirroring: by counting how many elements (vehicles 
and contents) must be eliminated before isomorphism is achieved, analog mirroring 
measures how close the system is to satisfying the isomorphism criterion. Because 
Almost Isomorphic Population Map can be made to satisfy the criterion by eliminating 
a single vehicle and a single content, that system has a very high, but not quite 
maximal, degree of analog mirroring. 
Let us say that a representational system S– is a subsystem of a system S just 
in case the syntactic and semantic spaces of S– are subspaces of the syntactic and 
semantic spaces of S. For example, a subsystem of Mercury Thermometer would be a 
system whose syntactic space includes mercury heights 1–90 (cutting out 91-100), 
whose semantic space includes temperatures 1–90 (cutting out 91-100), and which 
retained the taller-than and warmer-than relations on the remaining heights and 
temperatures. Intuitively, we can think of a subsystem as the original system with 
some vehicles and contents removed. 
Almost every system that has rulebound relations but that does not itself 
satisfy the isomorphism criterion will nevertheless have multiple subsystems that 
do.17 Some of these subsystems will be larger than others. Some (perhaps only one) 
such system will be maximal: it will be as big as or bigger than any other subsystem 
 
17 Why “almost every system”? Since the definition of a space requires that each relation be 
instantiated, systems in which the elimination procedure results in a single vehicle or single 
content (or less) will have an analog mirroring score of 0. 




that satisfies the isomorphism criterion. Almost Isomorphic Population Map has two 
such subsystems: (1) the subsystem that cuts the darkest shade of red and the second 
densest population, and (2) the subsystem that cuts the second darkest shade and 
the densest population. Call any maximal subsystem that satisfies the isomorphism 
criterion a mirrored subsystem of the original system. 
A system’s analog mirroring score is the ratio of the size of its mirrored 
subsystem(s) to the size of the system itself.18 
 
Analog Mirroring = 
size of mirrored subsystem
size of system  
 
Analog mirroring measures how much of the representational system 
satisfies isomorphism. This definition has some attractive formal features. Every 
system will have a mirroring score between 0 and 1. The maximum value—1—
occurs when no elements need to be eliminated because the original system itself 
already satisfies the isomorphism criterion. The minimum value—0—occurs when 
no subsystem satisfies isomorphism. To get a mirroring score above zero, a system’s 
interpretation function must codify some relations. When a system has no 
rulebound relations, it automatically gets a mirroring score of 0. 
This formalization yields intuitive verdicts across a variety of cases. 
Structural Population Map, which maps darker shades of red to denser populations 
with no exceptions, has a mirroring score of exactly 1. Since only two elements need 
to be eliminated from Almost Isomorphic Population Map, the mirrored subsystem of 
Almost Isomorphic Population Map is nearly as large as the original system. 
Consequently, Almost Isomorphic Population Map has a mirroring score of nearly 1. 
By contrast, Scrambled Population Map has a mirroring score of 0, since none of its 
subsystems satisfies isomorphism. 
 
18 In systems whose spaces contain a finite number of elements, it is natural to measure size 
in terms of cardinality. In systems whose spaces contain an infinite number of elements, we 
suggest appealing to the Lebesgue measure. See Tao [2011] for more discussion of measures. 




In effect, our analog mirroring measure is a degreed version of isomorphism. 
We suspect that such a measure can be useful not only for our theory, but also for 
research outside of analog representation.19 
 
4. Purity and Mass 
 Analog mirroring is a more nuanced measure of analogicity than the 
isomorphism criterion. Yet it is still not enough to fully capture the respects in which 
systems can be more or less analog. This section develops our two other measures: 
analog purity and analog mass. For clarity of exposition, we assume that the systems 
discussed in this section have maximum analog mirroring. This assumption is 
harmless: on our account, a system with non-maximum mirroring inherits its purity 
and mass values from its mirrored subsystem, which has maximum mirroring by 
definition. Mirroring may thus be thought of as the gatekeeper to the realm of the 
analog: without at least some mirroring, a system has no purity or mass, because it 
has no mirrored subsystem. 
 
4.1. Analog Purity 
Consider the following system: 
 
————— 
City Populations: Vehicles: 10 letters of the alphabet, each coming in three different 
sizes—big, medium, and small. Contents: Populations for 10 different cities. 
Interpretation: Each letter represents a different city (‘A’ represents Athens, ‘B’ 
represents Beijing, and so on). The size of the letter represents the approximate 
population of the city: a big letter represents “more than 10 million people,” a 
medium letter represents “between and 1 and 10 million people,” and a small letter 
represents “less than 1 million people.” 
————— 
 
19 As an example, Shea [2014: 140] notes that it would be useful to have a notion of 
“approximate isomorphism” in developing a theory of mental content. This is exactly what 
our mirroring measure delivers. 





City Populations has maximum analog mirroring, since its interpretation 
function is a bijection that preserves the larger-than relation on vehicles via the has-
greater-population-than relation on contents. However, the system seems less than 
maximally analog. Here is our diagnosis of this intuition: although City Populations’ 
interpretation function preserves all of the system’s structure, the system does not 
utilize much structure to begin with. 
Analog purity aims to capture this further dimension of analogicity by 
measuring the degree to which the system’s elements are structurally distinct from 
each other. More precisely, two elements are structurally distinct whenever they have 
different structural profiles, where two elements have the same structural profile just 
in case they bear exactly the same rulebound relations to every other element of the 
system. In City Populations, big-’A’ and big-’B’ have the same structural profile (and 
hence are not structurally distinct). This is because big-’A’ and big-’B’ bear the larger-
than relation to exactly the same elements. By contrast, big-’A’ and small-’A’ have 
distinct structural profiles (and hence are structurally distinct): small-’A’ bears the 
larger-than relation to no other letters whereas big-’A’ bears the larger-than relation 
to every small and medium letter.  
Let us say that two elements have distinct nominal profiles just in case they 
are representationally distinct despite having the same structural profile. In City 
Populations, nominal profiles correspond to letter types. Although big-’A’ and big-’B’ 
have the same structural profile, they are still representationally distinct: big-’A’ 
represents Athens while big-’B’ represents Beijing. To illustrate further, big-’A’ and 
small-’B’ have distinct nominal and distinct structural profiles (different letter, 
different size), whereas small-’A’ and ‘big-‘A’ have identical nominal but distinct 
structural profiles (same letter, different size). The nominal profiles can be counted 
by taking the total number of elements in the space and dividing by the number of 
structural profiles. 
The purity of a system is determined by comparing the number of structural 
and nominal profiles: 
 
Analog Purity = 
number of structural profiles
number of structural profiles + number of nominal profiles
 





Analog purity is designed to capture the degree to which a system’s 
elements are structurally distinct from each other. A system has maximum purity 
exactly when, in each of the syntactic and semantic domains, every element is 
structurally distinct from every other element. In such a system, each element has a 
unique structural profile. The more a system diverges from this ideal, the lower its 
purity. In systems that fall short of maximum purity, some elements have the same 
structural profile but different nominal profiles. These are exactly the elements that 
diminish a system’s purity score.20 
Purity is a degree-theoretic measure of analogicity. Like mirroring, it has a 
maximum value: 1. This maximum occurs for all and only systems in which each 
element has a unique structural profile. Purity also has a minimum value: 0. This 
minimum occurs in systems that have no rulebound relations and thus no structural 
profiles. This minimum value also occurs for any systems that have zero mirroring, 
since purity is defined over a representational system’s mirrored subsystem. 
A technical point is worth mentioning here. Because the subsystems under 
consideration have maximum analog mirroring, the syntactic and semantic space 
are guaranteed to mirror each other perfectly. As a result, there will always be the 
same number of structural profiles for both the syntactic space and the semantic 
space. In City Populations, the semantic structural profiles correspond to 
(represented) populations, and the syntactic structural profiles correspond to letter 
sizes. Whether we count syntactically or semantically, we get the result that City 
 
20 In the special case where every element of a system has a unique structural profile, we take 
the system to have zero nominal profiles. There is perhaps a sense in which a maximally pure 
system, where every element has a unique structural profile, contains a single “nominal 
profile.” However, counting nominal profiles in this way would fail to serve its main role: 
namely, gauging “the extent to which the system contains distinct elements that have the 
same structural profile.” In fact, no system would ever have maximum purity under this 
approach. Since we use the term ‘nominal profile’ to denote those non-structural features 
that make for a representational difference between elements, we do not count trivial 
features that all syntactic or semantic elements share, such as “is a letter”, as nominal. 




Populations has a purity score of 3/13, since on the syntactic side there are 3 letter 
sizes and 10 letters while on the semantic side there are 3 populations and 10 cities.21 
The unifying theme of the structural approach is that analog representation 
is a matter of structure corresponding to structure. In City Populations, all of the 
structure in the system corresponds to structure, and as a result the system has 
maximum mirroring. However, the system does not have much structure in the first 
place: most of the differences between City Population’s elements are nominal, rather 
than structural. In other words, little of the representational work done by City 
Populations is the result of structure corresponding to structure. By contrast, in 
Mercury Thermometer each element has a unique structural profile. The syntactic 
profiles are generated by height of mercury and the semantic profiles by 
temperature. As a result, Mercury Thermometer has no nominal profiles, so Mercury 
Thermometer has maximum purity. This illustrates how the purity measure captures 
the fact that City Populations is less analog, in at least one respect, than Mercury 
Thermometer, despite the fact that both have maximum mirroring.  
We can also make useful comparisons between systems that have less than 
maximum purity. For example, consider a variant on City Populations that uses 10 
letters coming in 10 sizes (instead of 3) to represent 10 cities of 10 different 
populations (instead of 3). This system has a greater number of structural profiles 
than City Populations but the same number of nominal profiles. As a result, City 
Populations has less purity (3/13) than the expanded system (10/20). This is the 
intuitively correct result. 
 
21 If there could be systems with infinitely many structural profiles but finitely many nominal 
profiles, then such systems would count as maximally pure given our definition (for such 
systems, the proportion of structural profiles to total profiles is 1). Nevertheless, some 
readers may have the intuition that such systems ought not count as maximally pure. In our 
view, such systems reveal a divergence between two equally good ways of measuring purity: 
namely, (1) by counting structural and nominal profiles (which is the measure we have 
defined) and (2) by counting structural and nominal features (such as letter or size). We focus 
only on the first formulation because doing so greatly simplifies the technical exposition with 
little loss. However, for those concerned about the kinds of infinitary systems described 
above, the second formulation provides a natural extension of our theory that accommodates 
the desired intuition. 





4.2. Analog Mass 
 The following pair of examples motivates the need for a third measure—
analog mass—alongside analog mirroring and analog purity.  
 
————— 
Sparse Heat Map—Vehicles: 10 colors ranging from pure red to pure blue. Contents: 
10 temperatures ranging from 0°C to 100°C. Interpretation: Redder colors map to 
warmer temperatures, bluer colors map to colder temperatures. 
 
Rich Heat Map—Vehicles: 1000 colors ranging from pure red to pure blue. Contents: 
1000 temperatures ranging from 0°C to 100°C. Interpretation: Redder colors map to 
warmer temperatures, bluer colors map to colder temperatures. 
————— 
 
These systems map redder colors to warmer temperatures and bluer colors 
to colder temperatures. Sparse Heat Map uses 10 colors to represent 10 temperatures; 
Rich Heat Map uses 1000 colors to represent 1000 temperatures. Since the redder-than 
relation on colors corresponds to the warmer-than relation on temperatures, both 
systems have maximum mirroring. Since each element of each system has a unique 
structural profile, both systems have maximum purity. Yet even though the systems 
have identical mirroring and purity scores, there remains a way in which Rich Heat 
Map is more analog than Sparse Heat Map. 
Here is our diagnosis. Mirroring and purity both provide proportional 
measures of how much of the system’s representational work is done by structure 
representing structure. But degree of analogicity is also a function of the absolute 
amount of representational work done by structure representing structure. Analog 
mass captures this idea: 
 
𝐀𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝐌𝐚𝐬𝐬 =  number of structural profiles 
 




Mass is simply the numerator of purity. It can be calculated as outlined in 
the previous section. To return to our example: Sparse Heat Map has 10 structural 
profiles; Rich Heat Map has 1000.22 Because of this, although the two systems are 
equivalent with respect to their mirroring and purity scores, Rich Heat Map has 
greater analog mass than Sparse Heat Map. The mass measure allows us to capture 
the respect in which the 1000-color map is more analog than the 10-color map. Note 
that unlike mirroring and purity, mass has no maximum: there is no limit to the 
number of structural profiles that a system can have. 
 
4.3. The Rulebound Structure Theory 
The unifying theme of the structural approach is that analog representation 
is a matter of structure corresponding to structure. We have developed and 
precisified this intuitive idea into three measures: analog mirroring, analog purity, 
and analog mass. Each measure captures a distinct way in which a system can live 
up to that core slogan. In particular, analog mirroring measures the extent to which 
structure corresponds to structure, analog purity measures the proportion of the 
representational work done by structure corresponding to structure, and analog 
mass measures the absolute amount of representational work done by structure 
corresponding to structure. 
Some readers might have intuitions that our measures are unable to capture. 
In our view, there are many measures that can track intuitions about relative 
analogicity. Rather than try to capture all intuitions expressible using the phrase 
“more analog”, we have focused on what we take to be three fundamental, general, 
and joint-carving measures. Other readers may wonder how our measures combine 
to yield a total analogicity score. We wish to resist the idea that there is any objective 
 
22 There is a way of counting profiles where Sparse Heat Map has 20 structural profiles: 10 
syntactic structural profiles (colors) and 10 semantic structural profiles (temperatures). 
However, because analog mass (as well as analog purity) applies only to mirrored 
subsystems, the numbers of structural and nominal profiles will always be identical between 
the syntactic and semantic spaces. We count in the way that yields 10 structural profiles 
because we find it simpler. Since each method of counting generates the same comparative 
rankings between systems, nothing turns on this choice. 




fact of the matter about how to weigh these measures against one another. Our view 
is that these measures identify distinct dimensions along which representational 
systems can be more or less analog, each of which can vary independently of the 
others. Each of these principles tracks different families of intuitions about degree 
of analogicity. Relatedly, our principal focus is on generating the right comparisons 
as to which systems are more or less analog along the relevant dimensions, rather 
than on the absolute numbers outputted by the measures. 
While some discussions of analog representation take analogicity to come in 
degrees, others characterize it as a binary property. Our focus has been on the 
degreed aspects of analogicity, but we can extract several binary conceptions of 
analogicity from our degree-theoretic measures. First, both analog mirroring and 
analog purity have a maximum value. We can say that a system is perfectly analog 
just in case it has both maximum mirroring and maximum purity. Nearly all 
paradigms of analog representation, including mercury thermometers, hand clocks, 
and photographs, are perfectly analog. Second, mirroring, purity, and mass all have 
a minimum value. We can say that a system is perfectly symbolic when it has 
minimum (i.e. zero) mirroring, and thus zero purity and mass. Conversely, when a 
system has non-zero mirroring, purity, and mass, it is not perfectly symbolic, and is 
thus at least somewhat analog.23 
 
5. Hybrid Systems 
This section explains how our framework can be used to analyze hybrid 
systems, an often overlooked class of representations. A hybrid system is a 
representational system that has some features that represent analogically and some 
features that represent symbolically. As an example, consider Colored Thermometer, 
in which a colored column represents both temperature and cloud cover: 
 
 
23 These ways of extracting binary measures avoid imposing arbitrary thresholds on our 
degreed measures. We believe these binary measures carve the relevant representational 
kinds in a principled and intuitively satisfying way. Nevertheless, those who disagree could 
still use our measures but adopt a different threshold marking what is required for a system 
to count as analog. 





Colored Thermometer—Vehicles: Colored columns coming in 3 colors and 100 
heights. Contents: Combinations of temperature and cloud coverage. 
Interpretation: Taller columns represent warmer temperatures. Blue represents 
clear skies, yellow represents partly cloudy, and red represents overcast. 
————— 
 
Theories of analog representation tend to either deliver the wrong results for 
hybrid systems (by classifying them as analog or symbolic simpliciter) or do not 
suggest any obvious way of handling them (because the theory is not explicit 
enough to deliver a verdict). In contrast, our mirroring, purity, and mass measures 
yield plausible verdicts when applied to hybrid systems. First, Colored Thermometer 
has maximum mirroring, since the interpretation function is an isomorphism under 
the relations codified by the rules of the system (the taller-than and warmer-than 
relations). Second, Colored Thermometer has the same degree of mass as Mercury 
Thermometer, since both systems have the same number of structural profiles. But 
third, Colored Thermometer suffers with respect to purity because it has nominal 
profiles (colors and cloud coverages) while Mercury Thermometer does not. 
Consequently, our theory predicts that Colored Thermometer is less analog than 
Mercury Thermometer. 
We believe these verdicts are correct, but there remains a further 
explanandum. Colored Thermometer seems to represent temperature analogically (via 
height) and cloud coverage symbolically (via color). Since our measures track 
degrees of analogicity for whole systems, our theory is not yet sensitive to the fact 
that some features of a system can represent analogically while other features 
represent symbolically. However, there is a natural way of extending our theory to 
accommodate this datum. To forecast: our theory will claim that the degree to which 
a feature represents analogically is determined by the degree of analogicity of the 
partial system generated by partitioning according to that feature. 
We start by introducing the notion of a partial system. Informally, partial 
systems result from abstracting away from some of the original system’s 
representational distinctions. For example, one partial system of Colored Thermometer 
groups columns by height and ignores color. A partial system of a representational 




system is generated by partitioning each of the syntactic and semantic spaces in a 
manner that retains the interpretation function. A partition of any set is a division of 
that set’s elements into subsets—called cells—such that every element occurs in 
exactly one subset. A partition retains the interpretation function if and only if any 
two vehicles of the original syntactic space occupy the same cell in the partitioned 
syntactic space just in case their contents (in the original system) also occupy the 
same cell (in the partitioned semantic space). Partitioning and retainment ensure 
that the resulting partial system is a “partial version” of the original whole. 
The elements of the partial system’s syntactic and semantic spaces are sets of 
syntactic or semantic elements of the original system. For example, the set 
containing a blue, yellow, and red column of 10cm height is one syntactic element 
of the “color ignoring” partial system of Colored Thermometer mentioned above. In 
order to apply our measures to the partial system, we need to define the relations 
that structure it. Let us say that two cells A and B of the partial system bear relation 
r to each other just in case every element in A bears r to every element in B. This 
definition entails that the set containing blue, yellow, and red columns of 10cm 
height bears the taller-than relation to the set containing blue, yellow, and red 
columns of 8cm height. In other words, the relations that structure the original 
system are “exported” in the straightforward way to the partial system. 
Importantly, we can apply our measures of analog mirroring, purity, and mass to 
partial systems so defined. 
Every representational system has many partial systems. But the interesting 
partial systems are those that correspond to what we would intuitively call the 
features of the system. Colored Thermometer has two features: color and height. First, 
when the system is partitioned according to color (ignoring height), the result is a 
partial system with only three syntactic elements—blue, yellow, and red—and three 
semantic elements—clear skies, partly cloudy, and overcast. Because there are no 
rulebound relations between these elements, our theory predicts that this partial 
system has zero analogicity. Second, when the system is partitioned according to 
height (ignoring color), the result is a partial system that has as many syntactic 
elements as there are syntactically distinct heights. In this partial system, each 
syntactic cell contains three elements: a blue, a yellow, and a red column of identical 
height. When we apply our measures, the partial system receives maximum 




mirroring and maximum purity. In the terminology introduced earlier, the height 
partial system is perfectly analog and the color partial system perfectly symbolic. 
This entails that in Colored Thermometer, height represents analogically and color 
symbolically, which is exactly the verdict a theory should deliver. 
This approach to partial systems generalizes in straightforward ways. Recall 
City Populations, the system we used to motivate the analog purity measure. This 
system has two features: letter character (representing city) and letter size 
(representing population). The size partial system has maximum purity, since each 
of its cells corresponds to a distinct structural profile (though the system still has 
relatively low mass). The letter partial system is purely symbolic, since its cells do 
not stand in any rulebound relations to each other. 
This way of thinking about partial systems allows the rulebound structure 
theory to answer not only the question “Which representational systems are analog 
and to what degree?” but also “Which features within a given system represent 
analogically and to what degree?” Both questions are important. Our theory’s ability 
to answer both is evidence of its power and flexibility. 
 
6. Other Theories of Analog Representation 
 This section reviews how the rulebound structure theory relates to several 
prominent theories of analog representation. 
 
6.1. Density 
According to density theories, a representational system is analog exactly 
when it is syntactically and semantically dense.24 In brief, a syntactically dense system 
is one in which between any two syntactically well-formed vehicles there is a third, 
while a semantically dense system is one in which between any two contents there 
is a third. In the ensuing discussion, we will simply grant that the density theorist 
 
24 A density theory could also rely on either syntactic density or semantic density alone. The 
canonical density theory, Goodman [1968], requires both, so we operate with that 
conception. The arguments we offer against such a theory generalize easily to other density 
accounts. See Schonbein [2014] for a syntactic density account. 




has a principled way of characterizing what it is for one element to lie “between” 
two other elements. 
While we think there is an important grain of truth in density theories, we 
believe that they are extensionally inadequate. First, density theories are too 
exclusive. Many non-dense systems are analog. Consider again Structural Population 
Map, where 100 red shades represent 100 population densities and darker shades 
indicate higher population density. This system has only 100 red shades, meaning 
that there are no syntactically distinct shades in between (say) red34 and red35; 
intermediate densities cannot be represented. Although this system is neither 
syntactically nor semantically dense, it is nevertheless intuitively analog. The 
rulebound structure theory counts Structural Population Map as having maximum 
mirroring and purity: the interpretation function is an isomorphism and every 
representational difference arises from a structural difference. 
 Second, density accounts are too inclusive. They incorrectly count certain 
systems as analog. Consider Scrambled Population Map: 
 
————— 
Scrambled Population Map—Vehicles: Infinitely many shades of red. Contents: 
Infinitely many population densities. Interpretation: Each shade of red is arbitrarily 
mapped to a different population density so that there is a non-structure-preserving 
bijection between shades of red and population densities. 
————— 
 
Suppose that the set of red shades is dense. Because each shade represents a 
different population density, Scrambled Population Map is syntactically and 
semantically dense. But the mapping between shades and population densities is 
completely arbitrary; no relation between population density can be read off the 
relations between red shades. Therefore, density accounts incorrectly count 
Scrambled Population Map as analog. By contrast, the rulebound structure theory 
provides a diagnosis for why the system is not analog: in particular, the system fails 
to achieve even a low degree of analog mirroring. 
Though we have argued that density accounts are extensionally inadequate, 
we think that density accounts still track an important truth. In order for a dense 




system to be interpretable, it must be analog in our sense. That is, dense systems 
must have interpretation functions that preserve structure. Imagine trying to 
interpret Scrambled Population Map. Perhaps you think you see red42, but might that 
be red42.1 or even red42.01? Since the system’s interpretation function does not preserve 
structure, there are no constraints on how the structure of the vehicles maps to the 
structure of the contents. It may be that red42 represents 670 people/km2, red42.1 
represents 11 people/km2, and red42.01 represents 927 people/km2. Since you cannot 
be sure whether you are seeing red42 or instead one of the infinitely many nearby 
shades, you could easily be radically wrong about the content. By contrast, if the 
interpretation function did preserve structure, then nearby shades of red would 
represent nearby population densities. In such a scenario, even if you were unsure 
of the exact identity of a vehicle, you could still be relatively confident of the content. 
These observations indicate that mirroring secures the interpretability of dense 
systems. As a result, dense systems will tend to be analog.25 
 
6.2. Magnitude Mirroring 
According to magnitude mirroring theories, analog representation is a matter 
of magnitudes of the vehicle mapping to magnitudes of the content.26 For example, 
Peacocke [2019: 52] writes that “analogue representation is representation of 
magnitudes, by magnitudes.” Examples of magnitudes include length, mass, 
temperature, and duration. The defining features of magnitudes is that they come 
in greater and lesser extents. For example, a temperature of 6°C is greater than 2°C 
but less than 7°C. 
 
25 This is similar to a feature that Kulvicki [2015] highlights: that abstractions over syntax 
correspond to abstractions over semantic values. We agree with Kulvicki that density is a 
symptom (rather than the source) of analogicity. But we also think that Kulvicki’s 
explanation (in terms of abstraction) can likewise be explained by a more fundamental 
theory of analog representation. See Kulvicki [2015: §2–3] for an insightful discussion of the 
connection between density, abstraction, and interpretation. 
26 Magnitude mirroring theories include Beck [2015, 2019], Block [forthcoming], Lewis [1971], 
Maley [2011], and Peacocke [2019]. 




In our view, magnitude mirroring theories are on the right track but cast too 
narrow a net. To begin, observe that analog representation need not involve 
magnitudes. Consider hue: it does not make sense to say that x is greater than y with 
respect to hue, so hue is not a magnitude. But it is obvious that systems in which 
hue values of the vehicle map to hue values of the content (e.g. photographs) ought 
to count as analog. The magnitude theorist could respond that magnitudes need not  
be linearly ordered. To some extent, this is a verbal question about the term 
‘magnitude’. However, magnitudes are standardly defined in metaphysics and the 
philosophy of science as coming in lesser or greater extents. As examples, Helmholtz 
[1887: 17] says that “a magnitude is a quality of objects that is amenable to ordering 
from smaller to greater,” Kyburg [1997: 381] writes that magnitudes are the values 
of “quantity function[s]” and “reflect the structure of the real [numbers],” and Lewis 
[2009: 206] defines magnitudes as “properties that admit of degree.” 
More importantly, even if one permits magnitudes to lack linear ordering, 
existing magnitude accounts do not explain how magnitude mirroring works in 
these cases. For example, Beck [2019: 334] says that analog representation involves 
“the representation of one magnitude by a second magnitude such that the second 
magnitude has the function of increasing or decreasing with the first.” These 
accounts do not generalize in any straightforward way to non-linearly ordered 
structures, since those kinds of systems do not yield a meaningful notion of 
increasing or decreasing. By contrast, the rulebound structure theory of analog 
representation applies just as straightforwardly to systems without magnitudes as 
it does to systems with magnitudes.27 
Finally, magnitude mirroring theories are usually all-or-nothing: either 
magnitudes represent magnitudes or not. However, we have presented a number 
of cases illustrating how analog representation comes in degrees. In City Populations 
the size magnitude represents the population magnitude. The magnitude mirroring 
theorist must say that this system is analog simpliciter. But City Populations (in which 
 
27 Beck [2019] argues that Weber’s Law is best explained by taking perception to involve 
magnitude mirroring, and that this result is evidence that perception is analog. We are 
sympathetic to Beck’s arguments. Since the rulebound structure theory takes magnitude 
mirroring to be one way for a system to be analog, we agree that evidence of magnitude 
mirroring is evidence of analogicity. 




letters represent cities) does not seem as analog as, say, Mercury Thermometer. Our 
theory captures this difference by generating the result that while both systems have 
maximum mirroring, City Populations has relatively low purity and mass. 
 
6.3. Abstraction 
According to abstraction theories, analog representation is a matter of 
abstractions over vehicles corresponding to abstractions over contents (Kulvicki 
2015). For example, these theories contend that Mercury Thermometer is analog 
because abstractions over vehicles (e.g. mercury heights between 5cm and 6cm) 
correspond to abstractions over contents (e.g. temperatures between 25°C and 30°C).  
Though we believe abstraction theories are on the right track, we also think 
they identify a symptom, rather than the source, of analog representation. A theory 
of analog representation ought to explain why analog systems enable abstractions; 
the fact that a system yields these abstractions is unlikely to be a brute feature of that 
system. Our view is that these abstractions are possible because of the nature of the 
interpretation functions of analog systems. We have argued that analog systems 
have interpretation functions that preserve the structure induced by their rulebound 
relations. For example, Mercury Thermometer’s interpretation function maps taller-
than to warmer-than. Because of this, abstractions over height correspond to 
abstractions over temperature. In other words, our account identifies the underlying 
feature of analog systems that grounds the core component of abstraction theories. 
There are also extensional differences between our theory and the 
abstraction theory. On the abstraction theory, a system is analog to the extent that it 
enables the relevant abstractions. On the rulebound structure theory, a system is 
analog to the extent that its interpretive rules map syntactic structural features onto 
semantic structural features. Rulebound structure preservation entails 
abstractability, but abstractability does not entail rulebound structure preservation. 
Consider again Stipulated Population Map, which has 100 red shades mapping to 100 
population densities such that darker shades represent greater densities. For this 
system, abstractions over color correspond to abstractions over population. 
However, Stipulated Population Map is not analog on our account because its 
interpretation function does not operate on any rulebound relations. Instead, the 
interpretation function stipulatively maps each red shade, one by one, to a specific 




population density. Because of the lack of rulebound relations, the system has zero 
mirroring, and by consequence fails to satisfy our criteria for analog representation. 
This difference between the abstraction theory and the rulebound structure theory 
is due to how each theory deals with the interpretation function. For the abstraction 
theory, all that matters are the inputs and outputs of the interpretation function. 
Because of this, the abstraction theory is not sensitive to any intensional differences 
between interpretation functions. By contrast, the rulebound structure theory looks 
“inside” the interpretation function. As a result, it can distinguish between (for 
example) Stipulated Population Map and Structural Population Map, which map the 
same inputs to the same outputs but which use different rules.  
For those with residual feelings that Stipulated Population Map is analog, there 
is a straightforward way of explaining away that intuition: Stipulated Population Map 
has a feature—namely, abstraction—that is often a symptom of genuine analog 
representation. Moreover, if one is presented with only the input-output structure 
of Stipulated Population Map, it is natural to assume that the system has the rules of 
Structural Population Map. However, we think that once one recognizes the 
difference between Stipulated Population Map and Structural Population Map, there is 
clearly a respect in which the former is symbolic and the latter analog. 
 
6.4. Surveying the Structural Approach 
All of the theories we have discussed—density theories, magnitude 
mirroring theories, abstraction theories, as well as our own rulebound structure 
theory—fall under what we have called the “structural approach” to analog 
representation. The unifying theme of the approach is that analog representation is 
a matter of structure corresponding to structure.28 Now that we have discussed each 
 
28 Although theories of structural representation do not target analog representation, they also 
frequently appeal to the idea of structure corresponding to structure. For example, Shea 
[2014: 123] writes that structural representation occurs when “a relation between 
representational vehicles represents a relation between the entities they represent.” (See also 
Ramsey [2007: 77-92], Shagrir [2012], and Swoyer [1991]). However, even setting aside the 
fact that they aim at different targets, structural representation theories remain importantly 
different from structural theories of analog representation. First, structural representation 




of these theories individually, it is worth making some general remarks about the 
structural approach. Any structural theory should answer the following two 
questions: 
 
Structure Question:  What counts as structure? 
Correspondence Question: What counts as structure corresponding to structure? 
 
To answer the structure question, most theories within the structural 
approach appeal to a certain kind of structure: density theories appeal to dense 
structure, magnitude mirroring theories appeal to magnitudinal structure, and 
abstraction theories appeal to abstractability structure. We have argued that the 
mark of the analog does not lie with any particular kind of structure. Instead, we 
have adopted a liberal approach, where any kind of rulebound structure can be used 
to represent analogically. We provided a story of where this structure comes from: 
namely, from the rules of the interpretation function. On our picture, the structure 
of a representational system is determined by the relations codified by its 
interpretive rules. 
To answer the correspondence question, most theories appeal to the idea of 
structure “mirroring” structure, where the notion of mirroring is either left intuitive 
or cashed out in terms of isomorphism. We have argued that simple isomorphism 
accounts fail because isomorphism is all-or-nothing while analogicity comes in 
degrees. In response, we have developed a precise degree-theoretic mirroring 
measure, which we believe captures an intuitive sense of mirroring.  
 
requires that the relevant relations serve as inputs to further processing. By contrast, the 
rulebound structure theory requires only that the relations occur in the rules of the 
interpretation function. Other structural theories of analog representation do not require 
even that much. Second, analog representation and structural representation are 
extensionally different: mercury thermometers are paradigms of analog representation, but 
do not count as structural representations at all (since users do not normally interpret 
mercury thermometers by processing relations between pairs of mercury heights). Third, the 
vehicles of structural representation must be complex: “some of the proper parts of the 
structure that does the representing must themselves be representations” (Shea 2014: 135). 
By contrast, analog representations have no such complexity requirement. 




Furthermore, we have argued for the surprising conclusion that even 
systems with perfect mirroring can be more or less analog. For example, the 
syntactic structure of City Populations maximally mirrors its semantic structure. Yet 
the system remains less than perfectly analog because many of its features represent 
symbolically. This claim holds not only for the technical analog mirroring measure 
we have developed, but also for pre-theoretical conceptions of mirroring. In light of 
this, we think that an adequate answer to the correspondence question should not 
only explain what is meant by “structure corresponding to structure,” but also 
provide a way of measuring the proportion of and absolute amount of 
representational work done by structure corresponding to structure. This is exactly 
what our analog purity and analog mass measures do. To our knowledge, no other 
theory of analog representation has clearly identified these other aspects of 
analogicity. 
It is worth noting that our answers to the structure and correspondence 
questions are somewhat separable. While we favor the view that any rulebound 
structure can contribute to analogicity, it is possible to reject our intensionalist 
framework but endorse our degree-theoretic measures. For example, one could 
accept that mirroring, purity, and mass provide good answers to the 
correspondence question yet still think that only magnitudinal structure matters for 
analog representation. Conversely, while we favor mirroring, purity, and mass as 
measures of what it is for structure to correspond to structure, it is possible to reject 
our measures yet endorse our intensionalist framework and our rulebound account 
of structure. For example, one could accept that any rulebound structure can 
contribute to analogicity yet still favor an isomorphism account of correspondence. 
These considerations show how the components of the rulebound structure theory 
are relatively modular. We believe the complete package yields an intuitive and 
satisfying theory of analog representation. But given the modularity of our view, 




We now consider objections. 
 




7.1. The Gruesome Structure Objection 
Consider Gruesome Thermometer, which has the same vehicles and contents 
as Mercury Thermometer, but which maps vehicles to contents in a seemingly random 
way, with no correspondence between taller-than and warmer-than. Intuitively, 
Gruesome Thermometer is not analog. Yet Gruesome Thermometer can be understood in 
a way that forces the rulebound structure theory to give the system high mirroring, 
purity, and mass scores. 
Suppose the interpretation function for Gruesome Thermometer operates on 
the schwarmer-than relation, where 92°C is schwarmer-than 70°C, which is schwarmer-
than 80°C, and so on. The schwarmer-than relation is gerrymandered so as to generate 
the result that Gruesome Thermometer has maximum mirroring, maximum purity, 
and high mass. This makes Gruesome Thermometer come out just as analog, on all the 
measures, as the more familiar Mercury Thermometer.29 More generally, the 
rulebound structure theory may seem to classify as analog any representational 
system whose interpretation function codifies and preserves gruesome structural 
relations, no matter how symbolic such a system seems. The objection is that this 
classification is incorrect. 
We will provide two potential responses to the gruesome structure 
objection. Which response one favors will depend on prior metaphysical and 
metasemantic commitments. Since addressing those commitments in detail would 
take us too far astray, we will simply articulate the responses without taking a stance 
on which is better. 
The first option is to adopt a naturalness constraint, which says that only 
natural rulebound relations count toward analogicity. The idea behind naturalness 
is that some relations (e.g. warmer-than) carve nature at its joints whereas others (e.g. 
schwarmer-than) do not. Though there is disagreement on the nature of naturalness, 
there is usually agreement on which properties are (and are not) natural. Under this 
first option, even if gruesome relations like schwarmer-than can be codified by 
 
29 Readers might notice that Gruesome Thermometer is similar to our earlier example Scrambled 
Thermometer. These systems have the same input-output structure, but they differ in their 
rules: Gruesome Thermometer has gruesome rulebound relations while Scrambled Thermometer 
has no rulebound relations at all. 




interpretation functions, they do not make a system more analog. On such an 
approach, analog representation is not merely a matter of structure corresponding 
to structure, but rather a matter of natural structure corresponding to natural 
structure. This option yields the verdict that Gruesome Thermometer is not analog at 
all.30 
The second option accepts that Gruesome Thermometer is analog and appeals 
to a metasemantic error theory to explain why such a system strikes us as less analog 
than natural systems. Even if any relations whatsoever can in principle be codified 
by interpretation functions to yield analog representational systems, it is plausible 
that only analog systems that map natural relations to natural relations are amenable 
to creation and interpretation by humans. If humans were to create a system whose 
inputs and outputs were identical to Gruesome Thermometer’s, such a system would 
use purely stipulative rules rather than systematic rules operating over gruesome 
relations. Because of this, there is a danger that one’s intuitions about Gruesome 
Thermometer are really tracking features of Stipulated Gruesome Thermometer, a system 
that our theory would classify as symbolic. On the other hand, if there were 
gruesome aliens who perceived the world in terms of the schwarmer-than relation, 
then those aliens may well find Gruesome Thermometer more analog than Mercury 
Thermometer. The basic idea motivating this response is that Gruesome Thermometer 
is just as analog as Mercury Thermometer, but merely strikes us as less analog because 
of the kinds of relations we humans happen to use to carve up reality. 
 
7.2. The Small Systems Objection 
 Consider the following system: 
 
 
30 See Lewis[1983] and Dorr and Hawthorne [2013] on what naturalness is. See Lewis [1984] 
and Williams [2015] for the use of naturalness as a metasemantic constraint. The idea that 
something like naturalness divides the analog from the symbolic (or digital) is endorsed by 
Lewis [1971], and is also a theme in work on the distinction that appeals to the notions of 
convention and natural correspondence (see Giardino and Greenberg [2015, §1.1]). On these 
approaches, analog (or iconic) representation involves natural correspondence, while 
symbolic representation is wholly conventional. 





Arrows—Vehicles: Arrows placed on trail signs. Arrows come in three sizes: Long, 
Medium, and Short. Contents: Distances. Interpretation: A long arrow represents 




Arrows uses arrows placed on wooden signs along a walking path to indicate 
how far the walker is from the next landmark. Longer arrows represent greater 
distances. The rulebound structure theory gives Arrows maximum mirroring and 
purity (but low mass). However, a perfect score on two out of three measures may 
strike the reader as overly generous for a system that does not seem very analog at 
all. More generally, the small systems objection says that our theory incorrectly 
counts small systems as highly analog. 
First, we think it is somewhat misleading to say that Arrows is highly analog. 
Though Arrows scores highly on two out of three measures, the fact that it scores 
extremely low on the third measure is significant for assessing intuitions about 
analogicity. In fact, we think that ordinary ascriptions of analogicity typically 
require relatively high scores on all three measures. Since Arrows has low mass, we 
would expect most people to judge Arrows to be not particularly analog. 
Second, there is an alternative way of precisifying how the Arrows system 
works, and this alternative precisification may confound intuitions about 
analogicity. On the stipulative precisification, Arrows’ interpretation function assigns 
the contents “more than 1km,” “200-1000m,” and “less than 200m” to the long, 
medium, and short arrows directly. On the structural precisification, Arrows’ 
interpretation function relies on a “longer than” relation between the arrow 
symbols. Only on the second precisification does Arrows count as having maximum 
mirroring and purity. 
In fact, if one were told only the inputs and outputs of Arrows, the stipulative 
interpretation would be the most natural way to understand how Arrows works. If 
tasked with assigning the three arrows to their contents, most would take the easy 
route and simply stipulate which arrow has which content. The alternative method 
of inventing rules that relate length relations between arrows to distance relations 
between paths is more convoluted for systems as simple as Arrows. Imagine going 




on a hike and encountering the trail signs of the Arrows system. Typically, such trail 
signs include a key that captures the system’s interpretation function. The key is 
overwhelmingly likely to simply list each vehicle next to its content. This is evidence 
that small systems like Arrows will, in general, tend to be symbolic, and not use 
interpretative rules that rely on structure. 
 
7.3. The Verbal Dispute Objection 
What exactly turns on which theory of analog representation is true? To 
some readers, it may seem that there are many ways of precisifying the notion of 
analog representation and that nothing significant turns on which notion we adopt. 
Perhaps the rulebound structure theory targets one representational kind, 
magnitude mirroring theories target another, density accounts yet another, and so 
on. 
 While we agree that some disputes about analog representation may be 
partly verbal, we also think that theorists of analog representation have a common 
target. After all, no philosophers of analog representation take their claims to be 
stipulatively true. If developing a theory of analog representation were a matter of 
stipulation, then it would make little sense to appeal to intuitions about cases. 
Instead, philosophers develop theories that purport to identify what they take to be 
an interesting representational kind and to explain the nature of that kind. It is easy 
to see that not all representational kinds are equally interesting: the category 
“representations that are accurate on Tuesdays” is far less interesting than the 
category “representations that involve magnitude mirroring,” which (in our view) 
is less interesting still than the category “representations whose interpretation 
functions map rulebound structure to rulebound structure.” In appealing to 
intuitions about cases, we have sought to evoke intuitions about joints between 
representational kinds rather than intuitions about the extension of the English 
word ‘analog’. Our theorizing is better thought of as conceptually engineering the 
notion of the analog, rather than as trying to capture its ordinary usage. 
Moreover, we think the rulebound structure theory does a better job of 
capturing the target representational kind than other theories. In some cases, 
existing theories of analog representation classify as symbolic systems that seem 
fundamentally similar to the systems they classify as analog. For example, density 




theories classify dense mercury thermometers as analog while classifying Mercury 
Thermometer, which has only 100 contents, as symbolic. In other cases, existing 
theories leave open how to apply their account to challenge cases. For example, it is 
unobvious how to make magnitude theories work for dimensions that lack ordinal 
structure (such as hue). Moreover, as far as we know, no prior discussion of analog 
representation explains how to deal with the lucky scrambled systems and hybrid 
systems discussed earlier. By contrast, the rulebound structure theory provides 
intuitive and satisfying verdicts on all of these issues. For these reasons, we believe 
the rulebound structure theory to be a genuine improvement over extant theories. 
Further evidence for the substantivity of these disputes comes from the 
observation that which of these theories is correct will have downstream 
implications for formal semantics. There is a budding field concerned with the 
project of developing formal semantics for non-symbolic, non-language-like 
representational systems.31 Providing a formal semantics requires providing an 
interpretation function. The rulebound structure theory identifies what form a 
formal semantics for analog systems should take. In particular, the formal semantic 
apparatus should consist of a set of rules that map syntactic relations between 
vehicles to semantic relations between contents. 
Finally, a virtue of the rulebound structure theory is that it explains some of 
the costs and benefits of using analog versus symbolic systems. We turn to this issue 
next. 
 
8. Fecundity and Flexibility 
 The rulebound structure theory explains the fact that analog systems are 
more fecund but less flexible than their symbolic counterparts. A representational 
system is semantically fecund to the extent that it has high expressive power relative 
to the complexity of its interpretation function. In other words, fecund systems 
generate greater expressive bang for their interpretive buck. To illustrate, contrast 
Structural Population Map, which uses 100 vehicles (shades of red) to represent 100 
contents (population densities) with Inkblots: 
 
31 See Casati and Varzi [1999], Cohn [2013], Cumming, Greenberg, and Kelly [2017], and 
Greenberg [2018] for some examples. 






Inkblots—Vehicles: 100 random inkblots. Contents: 100 types of fruit. 




Both systems map the same number of vehicles to the same number of 
contents. However, while Structural Population Map achieves this mapping largely 
through a single simple rule (darker shades represent denser populations), Inkblots 
has as many rules as it has vehicles, mapping each vehicle to its content one by one. 
This gives Structural Population Map greater fecundity than Inkblots. Although both 
systems map the same number of vehicles to the same number of contents, Structural 
Population Map does so more efficiently. 
Let us say that two systems are counterparts just in case exactly the same 
contents are expressible in each. Analog systems are more fecund than their 
symbolic counterparts.32 This is evident when we observe that analog 
representations exhibit two of the main symptoms of fecundity: they are easy to 
learn and easy to create. To learn Inkblots, you must memorize the content of each 
inkblot individually. Knowing the content of one inkblot gives you no purchase on 
the content of any other. By contrast, learning Structural Population Map is 
comparatively easy. Once you learn the contents of a few colors and that darker 
shades of greater represent greater population densities, you have basically learned 
the system. Furthermore, creating an analog system such as Structural Population is 
easier than creating a symbolic system such as Inkblots.33 If you were tasked with 
assigning 100 inkblots to 100 fruits while your philosophical nemesis was tasked 
 
32 We suspect that the restriction to counterpart systems is unnecessary for systems without 
complex representations involving multiple parts. 
33 In small systems with very few vehicles and contents, it may sometimes be easier to 
stipulate contents one-by-one rather than lay down rules capable of handling hundreds of 
contents. Arrows from §7.2 illustrates this situation. 




with assigning 100 shades of red to 100 population densities, your nemesis would 
finish first every time. 
The rulebound structure theory explains why analog systems are fecund: 
namely, because their interpretive rules take advantage of the structure of their 
vehicles and contents. Analog systems use structure as a resource to assign many 
contents in one fell swoop. A single simple rule (e.g. “darker shades represent 
greater densities”) can do a large amount of interpretative work, generating many, 
perhaps infinitely many, contents. By contrast, the interpretation functions of 
symbolic systems become increasingly complex as more vehicles and contents are 
added. The core reason for the ease of learning and ease of creation of analog 
systems is fundamentally the same: shades of red and populations have analogous 
structures that are easy to exploit for representational purposes. The learners and 
creators of an analog system can take advantage of this pre-existing structure; the 
metasemantic scaffolding is already in place. 
 If analog systems have all of these benefits, why use symbolic systems at all? 
In spite of their virtues, analog systems have a significant flaw: they are less 
semantically flexible than symbolic systems. This lack of flexibility manifests in two 
ways. First, analog systems are less modular than symbolic systems. Symbolic 
systems tend to use separate rules to map each vehicle to its content, whereas the 
rules of analog systems map many vehicles to contents all at once. This makes the 
alteration and addition of content assignments in analog systems more difficult than 
in symbolic systems. In Inkblots, any particular content assignment can be modified 
without changing the rest of the system, and it is simple to add a new inkblot to 
represent kumquat. By contrast, in Structural Population Map, it is difficult to change 
a particular assignment of color to population density without massively altering 
many other assignments, and the most straightforward way of extending the system 
would be to simply tack an extra symbolic rule onto the analog system. Second, 
analog systems are less general than symbolic systems, in that analog systems are 
limited in what we can use them to represent. For analog representation to be 
possible, the representational target must have some exploitable structure in the first 




place, and some vehicles with analogous structure must be available to do the 
representing. Symbolic representation imposes no such requirements.34  
Fecundity and flexibility provide insight into where we should or should not 
expect to encounter analog representation. Even when appropriately structured 
subject matter and vehicles are available, there may still be advantages to 
constructing a symbolic system. If one wants a flexible system with modular rules, 
a symbolic system is preferable. On the other hand, if one wants a system that is 
easy to create and learn, then analog representation will likely work best. These 
considerations apply not only to whole systems, but also to particular features of 
systems. Imagine a scenario in which representation along one parameter (such as 
spatial location) has exploitable structure, and where the designers of the system do 
not expect their representational needs to change. That parameter would be best 
represented analogically. But suppose there is also a second parameter (such as type 
of building) that does not have easily exploitable structure, or for which the 
designers expect there to be future modifications of the system (such as new types 
of buildings). That second parameter is best represented symbolically. 
 
9. Conclusion 
We began this paper with the question, “What is the mark of the analog?” 
We explained where to look for that mark—in interpretation functions—as well as 
what to look for—rules that map structure to structure. 
On our view, interpretation functions should be understood as sets of rules 
that map vehicles to contents, and not simply as vehicle-content pairs. A system’s 
structure is provided by the relations codified in the rules of its interpretation 
function. Analog systems are those marked by the use of interpretive rules that map 
syntactic structural features onto semantic structural features. Since systems can do 
better or worse in mapping structure onto structure, analogicity comes in degrees. 
Furthermore, systems can do better or worse in at least three different ways, 
corresponding to the measures we have called mirroring, purity, and mass. 
Mirroring measures the extent to which the system’s structure is preserved by its 
 
34 See Camp [2007] for a related discussion of the trade-offs between different types of 
representational systems. 




interpretation function; purity measures the proportion of representational 
distinctions that are due to structure; and mass measures the amount of 
representational distinctions due to structure.  
We have illustrated how the rulebound structure theory applies in a range 
of cases and compares to its main rivals. We think our theory does better on a variety 
of counts, including giving satisfying verdicts on systems that alternative theories 
misclassify. The rulebound structure theory’s three degree-theoretic measures allow 
considerable flexibility in accounting for which systems are (or are not) analog and 
to what extent. To our knowledge, these fine-grained comparisons between 
representational systems, including hybrid systems that are partially analog and 
partially symbolic, are not captured by any extant theory of analog representation. 
We have also responded to what we take to be the main objections to the rulebound 
structure theory and used the theory to explain why analog systems are fecund but 
lack flexibility. 
Analog systems are those that take advantage of a very basic 
representational resource: namely, the system’s structure. That structure is provided 
by the rules of its interpretation function. We have explained how these simple ideas 
yield a systematic theory with greater predictive accuracy and explanatory scope 
than its rivals. As a result, we believe the rulebound structure theory provides a 
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